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Quantum cryptography promises security based on the laws of physics with proofs of security
against attackers of unlimited computational power. However, deviations from the original assump-
tions allow quantum hackers to compromise the system. We present a side channel attack that takes
advantage of ventilation holes in optical devices to inject additional photons that can leak infor-
mation about the secret key. We experimentally demonstrate light injection on an ID Quantique
Clavis2 quantum key distribution platform and show that this may help an attacker to learn infor-
mation about the secret key. We then apply the same technique to a prototype quantum random
number generator and show that its output is biased by injected light. This shows that light injec-
tion is a potential security risk that should be addressed during the design of quantum information
processing devices.
I. INTRODUCTION
In modern computer networks, users need fast and se-
cure channels. Key distribution protocols based on com-
putational assumptions, such as the RSA cryptosystem
[1], enable the initial key exchange that these channels re-
quire. Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols [2, 3],
like BB84 [4] or Ekert [5] protocols, and their research [6–
9] and commercial [10] implementations offer a physics-
based alternative.
For ideal systems, the laws of quantum mechanics
guarantee that any existing eavesdropper is detected [11–
16], but practical implementations can deviate from the
original assumptions. There are multiple experimental
demonstrations of quantum hacking that exploit imper-
fections in the detectors [17–26] or problems with state
preparation [27, 28], among others.
One of the assumptions of QKD is that the equipment
is sealed from the outside, but this is not necessarily the
case. In this Article, we show a new potential attack vec-
tor due to ventilation holes. More specifically, we show
how an attacker can expose unintentional light paths into
the interior of quantum systems to inject additional pho-
tons that break the original assumption that the pulses
are either single photons or weak coherent states with a
controlled mean photon number.
The attack can be extended to quantum random num-
ber generators (QRNG), which are devices that take ad-
vantage of the inherent randomness in quantum mechan-
ics to produce random bit sequences. Many commer-
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cial models and prototypes are based on measuring the
quantum states of light [29] and must be protected from
external photons.
The Article is structured as follows. First, we intro-
duce optical attacks on security systems in Sec. II. Then,
we address the feasibility of ventilation hole attacks on
quantum optical devices and show experimental exam-
ples of attacks on a QKD system and a QRNG in Sec. III
and Sec. IV, respectively. We discuss potential eaves-
dropping risks due to light injection attacks and conclude
in Sec. V.
II. THE OPTICAL SIDE CHANNEL AND
LIGHT INJECTION ATTACKS
Attacks with light are, in many ways, related to elec-
tromagnetic attacks [30–32], but, in classical electronic
systems, light offers fewer possibilities for side channel
and injection attacks than methods that use electromag-
netic radiation up to the GHz range. Most electronic
systems are only slightly sensitive to light, if at all.
There are, however, a few classical examples that help
to understand the relevance of light injection attacks. In
semiconductor cryptographic chips, the photons emitted
from the transistors that are active during encryption
can be exploited to deduce the secret key stored in the
device [33, 34]. These attacks require access to the chip
and invasive methods like decapsulation. Similarly, if
we have the chip in our possession, laser light injection
can induce faults during encryption that reveal the secret
keys [35].
Light from the devices can also give information to at-
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FIG. 1. Server racks with a view to the outside. (a) A picture
taken at author’s (J.C.G.-E.’s) own university. (b) Computer
server room in Al-Faisilya Tower, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia [37].
tackers that cannot reach the system directly. Most elec-
tronic devices use light-emitting diodes (LEDs) to signal
normal operation and for quick visual diagnosis. Many
network cards have an LED that shines when data is
sent or received and, depending on the concrete circuit
design, the pattern of the light can follow the bit streams
and leak information about the transmitted or received
data [36]. These LEDs are, by design, well visible and
servers tend to be in plain sight, usually behind glass
doors, back to back to unknown equipment, or even by
windows (see Fig. 1).
These optical paths also open a backdoor for optical
injection attacks where an optical signal alters the nor-
mal operation of the device. External light has already
been behind some spontaneous failures in photosensitive
components. One such event is the accidental activa-
tion of the halon fire suppression system in the Haddam
Neck nuclear power plant in 1997 when a camera flash
affected the contents of an exposed EPROM memory in-
side a cabinet [38]. More recently, a similar camera-shy
behaviour has been noticed in the popular Raspberry Pi
single-board computer. The Raspberry Pi 2, Model B,
version 1.1, was noticed to turn off due to an exposed
component of the power supply, a phenomenon which
has been colourfully dubbed the “xenon death flash” [39].
The photoelectric effect in silicon is behind these two ex-
amples and they share a simple solution: covering the
offending component, which was, anyway, designed to
operate under a cover.
There have also been planned attacks on devices de-
signed to be secure, like slot machines. The payout mech-
anism of some models counts the returned coins with
a light sensor. Police have found some cheaters blind-
ing the optical detector inside the machine with a “light
wand”, a simple light source that could be introduced in
the coin slot. The blinded stop mechanism failed and the
coin reservoir was emptied whenever there was a prize,
no matter how small [40].
These few examples notwithstanding, light injection
attacks are a small concern in classical systems. In elec-
tronic systems, there are few components that can be af-
fected by light and the systems that primarily use optical
signals, like the optical fiber backbone that carries most
internet traffic, are well isolated. The optical signals have
relatively strong optical power levels and external light
couples very weakly to the inside of the optical fiber and
the other optical components. An attacker would need to
inject a signal with a large optical power before achiev-
ing any effect. In contrast, most quantum systems work
with only a few photons and need to address light injec-
tion attacks explicitly.
Here, we take advantage of the fact that most elec-
tronic and optical devices need ventilation to take away
the excess heat produced during operation. QKD sys-
tems include electronic processing elements and optical
devices like lasers, all of which require some form of heat
removal for a correct, stable operation. In particular,
at the infrared telecommunication wavelengths that are
required to take full advantage of the existing optical
fiber technology and infrastructure, single-photon detec-
tors have notoriously poor performance unless properly
cooled [41, 42]. The devices that are used in QKD must
have a proper thermal design that most likely will in-
volve ventilation holes to circulate the air in and out of
the machine.
Any ventilation hole that allows an optical path to an
uncovered optical device is a potential threat to security.
External light can enter unjacketed or poorly covered
fiber. While, under normal circumstances, the coupling
is too weak to be noticed, an attacker could introduce a
few additional photons that can make a huge difference
in quantum applications.
III. CASE STUDY: PHOTON INJECTION INTO
A QKD SYSTEM
Here we show that photon injection is a plausible at-
tack vector for QKD. The attack has its limitations, but
it is a potential threat and must be taken into account.
In this Section we describe the system under study, in-
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FIG. 2. Plug-and-play QKD device under attack. Alice’s
side includes a 90 :10 optical coupler (C) that diverts part of
the light for monitoring to a series of classical detectors, and
the quantum part with a variable attenuator (VOA), delay
line (DL), phase modulator (PM), and Faraday mirror (FM).
Alice uses the PM to introduce a secret phase and makes sure
that the total attenuation guarantees that the mean photon
number per pulse going back to the fiber channel is less than
the value prescribed by the protocol. The coupling path in our
attack is shown in green (gray): a ventilation hole in Alice’s
case gives light an access to the fiber spool of the DL. From
there, the injected photons can get to the phase modulator
and carry unwanted information to the outside fiber channel.
troduce the basic attack, and present and analyse the
results of a proof-of-principle experiment.
A. Device under study: Plug-and-play QKD
For our proof-of-concept we study the Clavis2 QKD
platform, which is based on a plug-and-play scheme
[23, 43]. Clavis2 was designed by ID Quantique for re-
search and development applications, and is now discon-
tinued [44]. Figure 2 shows the basic configuration of the
involved devices. Two sides, Alice and Bob, establish a
secret key using an optical fiber link. Bob sends to Alice a
sequence of pulses grouped in pairs at classical power lev-
els through the optical fiber channel. Alice measures the
power of the classical pulses she receives [23], and sets a
variable optical attenuator (VOA) to guarantee that the
signals that get out have a proper mean photon number
(typically less than one photon). Having quantum signals
is what makes the whole system secure.
Alice chooses a phase from {0, pi2 , pi, 3pi2 } and encodes it
in the second half of the pulse pair using a phase mod-
ulator (PM), which is located after a delay line (DL)
that helps to avoid problems with Rayleigh backscatter-
ing [43, 45]. Alice’s setup is completed with a Faraday
mirror (FM) that compensates for polarization asymme-
tries in the channel. The pulses then go back through the
DL, are attenuated again and cross a 10:90 fiber coupler
(C) before leaving Alice.
When Bob receives the single-photon pulses, he
chooses a random basis for his measurement. Depend-
ing on this choice, he can perfectly distinguish either be-
tween Alice’s states {0, pi} or {pi2 , 3pi2 }. If the random se-
lections of Alice and Bob are matched, they know Bob’s
measurement will show the random bit from Alice. An
eavesdropper, Eve, monitoring the channel cannot learn
these values without introducing errors and thus being
detected.
Our attack targets the delay-line fiber spool, which
in our device under study consists of 10.53 km of opti-
cal fiber. In plug-and-play QKD, the photons are sent
in trains of pulses and the timing of the trains and the
length of the DL are chosen so that forward and backward
travelling light only meet inside the fiber spool [43, 45].
B. Theory of attack
Principle: The attack uses a ventilation hole on Alice’s
side that allows an eavesdropper, Eve, to couple extra
light into the delay-line fiber spool. In order to minimize
bend losses, the fiber is wound around a spool with an
internal diameter of around 16 cm. The side of the spool
is open and the fiber in primary coating is exposed to the
outside with the only protection of a thin plastic wrap-
ping. The spool is placed close to a ventilation opening
(see Fig. 3). This location aligns well with standards that
require electronic parts not be reachable from the outside
[46], but it allows us to perform light injection attacks.
In our QKD fiber system, the light travels through
monomode optical fiber, where different mechanisms in-
troduce losses. We are mostly interested in reversible
loss mechanisms which couple some of the photons from
the guided modes of the fiber into radiated modes that
leak to the outside. The two most important reversible
loss mechanisms are Rayleigh scattering and bend losses.
Rayleigh scattering is the dominant cause of loss in silica
fibers at infrared wavelengths [47]. Additionally, bends
in optical fiber can lead to losses [48–52]. This weak cou-
pling to the outside is reversible and light coming from
the outside can couple to the core and remain inside the
fiber. This principle has been used before to design test
tools for optical fiber networks that inject light through
small bends without the need for a connector or a splice
[53, 54].
In our attack, light is injected into the fiber using
the reverse from these processes. Measurements with an
equivalent system with a spool of fiber removed from the
case suggest that light injection comes from a combina-
tion of Rayleigh scattering and bending effects. Compar-
ing the coupling of light at 1310 and 1550 nm, we see
that more photons enter the fiber at the lower 1310 nm
wavelength, where Rayleigh scattering is stronger for sil-
ica fibers. On the other hand, for both wavelengths, the
number of injected photons varied with the input angle
of a collimated laser beam with respect to the spool (in-
creasing the coupling for almost tangential incidence).
This suggests the geometry of the fiber also plays a role
in the coupling and there is a component related to direct
coupling at bends.
Attack setup: The injected light passes both inwards—
towards the phase modulator—and outwards—towards
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FIG. 3. Experimental setup for QKD system Clavis2.
(a) A collimated laser light beam (denoted by an arrow) from
a fiber collimator passes the ventilation hole and couples to
the delay line. We have removed a solid metal cover from
the system to show its internals. (b) A picture taken in the
dark shows how the light from the beam couples to the fiber
spool (for this picture we used a visible green laser instead of
1536 nm).
the channel. The photons coupled towards the channel
do not carry any useful information. We want to send the
light towards the phase modulator so that it will carry
the secret phase information from Alice.
The real situation is complex and includes the effect of
the plastic wrapping, the fan, and multiple other details,
but the heuristic of directing the light close to the tangent
to the curved fiber gave the highest coupling to the spool.
Not all the parts of the spool can be reached through the
ventilation hole. If possible, the light should enter the
spool close to the modulator output, which minimizes
the total loss.
In our experiment, the divergence of the beam was not
critical. A fiber laser was connected to a fiber collima-
tor a few centimeters from the ventilation hole giving a
loosely focused spot on the fiber spool (of a couple mil-
limeters diameter), illuminating multiple fibers in it. The
beam properties can only be controlled up to the trellis
protecting the ventilation hole. In the path to the fiber,
the beam is modified, particularly by the random rugos-
ity of the plastic that surrounds the fiber spool. Even if
the shape of the spot reaching the fiber changed, during
the experiment the injected number of photons did not
show any significant variation when the laser hit different
parts of the spool. The angle of the beam seemed to be
the most relevant parameter when there was a clear line
of sight.
The injected photons arriving at the PM—when it is
active—collect the phase information and get reflected
by the Faraday mirror. They then pass through the lossy
components in Alice and come out into the channel. Eve
can then measure them to extract the secret encoded
value. In this way, this attack is equivalent to a Trojan-
horse attack [55, 56], but it cannot be detected by mon-
itoring the input fiber. Alice’s side in Fig. 2 shows a
schematic representation of our attack.
We did not study the temporal characteristics of the
coupling. For simplicity we used a continuous-wave (c.w.)
laser. However, the attacker can adapt the time profile of
her light to maximize the number of photons that reach
the active PM. A realistic attack will be in between this
ideal limit and our c.w. approach. The trade-off between
timing precision and total power is discussed in Sec. III D.
Attack efficiency: Eve can compromise the system if
she is able to deduce Alice’s phase settings. If Eve uses
pulses longer than the time bin the PM is active, each
output photon is equivalent to the time bin qubits used
in the QKD protocol. The part of the light reaching
the inactive modulator serves as a phase reference. Ex-
perimentally, a simple alternative would be using a ho-
modyne detection setup (see [57] for an example of the
method in a Trojan-horse attack on QKD).
We will consider attacks where Eve uses all of the out-
put light (injected and legitimate photons). If Eve in-
jects photons at a slightly different wavelength than the
photons from Bob, she could also tell apart the injected
photons from the rest with a wavelength demultiplexer,
if needed. Given the low coupling we found during the
5experiments, Eves best strategy seems to be using also
the photons in the legitimate channel.
The success of Eve’s attacks depends on how many
photons she can get at the system output. While we
can experimentally measure injection efficiency into the
DL, the photons suffer additional losses inside Bob before
they reach the channel. We discuss the latter below.
We first consider normal QKD operation. Let’s as-
sume µA (µB) is the mean photon number per pulse com-
ing out of Alice (Bob), t is the channel transmission,
αA = 2(αcoup + αVOA + αspool + αPM) is the total round-
trip loss inside Alice with αcoup = 10.8 dB, αPM = 4.2 dB,
αspool = 4.6 dB and αVOA being the losses measured in
the coupler, phase modulator, fiber spool and VOA re-
spectively. We assume the Faraday mirror introduces a
negligible loss. For these values
αA = 2αVOA + 39.2 dB. (1)
The mean photon numbers µA and µB are related as
µA = µBt10
−αA/10. (2)
The mean photon number µB can be determined from
experimental measurements. In Ref. 23, the energy of the
pulse coming out of Bob was measured to be Eµ = 73 fJ;
which leads to µB = Eµλ/(hc) = 5.69× 105.
We assume that the system sets the value of the VOA
in such a way that optimizes µA for the corresponding
protocol: µA = t for BB84 [58] and µA = 2
√
t for SARG
protocol [59]. Using this in Eq. (2) we get
αA = 10 log µB dB (for BB84),
αA = 10 log µB + 5 log t− 10 log 2 dB (for SARG). (3)
The value of αVOA can be calculated from Eq. (1) as
αVOA = 9.2 dB (BB84),
αVOA = 7.7 + 2.5 log t dB (SARG).
(4)
Thus, to set the optimal value of µA, for the BB84 pro-
tocol the system sets the VOA to a constant value while
for the SARG protocol the value for the attenuation de-
pends on the channel loss, and varies in a range roughly
between 1.7 and 7.2 dB for the distances of a typical
QKD link using SARG (120 to 10 km respectively).
In order to quantify the performance of the attack we
need to estimate the extra mean photon number per pulse
µext coming out of Alice due to the injection of light from
Eve. Let’s assume that Eve sends external light that
reaches the fiber spool and manages to couple a mean
photon number µinj inside the fiber in a pulse towards
the PM that passes the PM during its phase-modulation
window. These photons go through the PM, reflect from
the FM, then pass through the PM, the delay line, the
VOA and the coupler to come out to the channel. The
total loss experienced by these photons is
αT = 2αPM + αspool + αVOA + αcoup. (5)
For BB84, this becomes αT = 33 dB while for SARG,
this becomes αT = 31.5 + 2.5 log t dB. The extra mean
photon number coming out of Alice is then
µext = µinj10
−αT/10. (6)
C. Experiment
In order to determine the mean number of injected
photons µinj, we used a c.w. laser at 1536 nm with a
power of 17.2 mW. We sent a collimated laser beam
through the ventilation hole into the delay-line fiber spool
(Fig. 3). A single-photon detector (ID Quantique ID201)
with efficiency ηd = 0.1, detection gate width T = 20 ns,
and gate repetition rate fs = 100 kHz was used to mea-
sure the injected light. The selected gate width is close
to the time the phase modulator is active (∼ 20 ns [20]),
thus we can directly use our photon count without any
time normalization. The gate rate was chosen in order
to allow sufficient time between the gates to avoid after-
pulsing. The photon count data was collected from mea-
surement at the output of the optical fiber spool. The
measured dark count rate was Ndc = 25.7 counts per sec-
ond and the average count rate with the c.w. laser on was
N = 58.95 counts per second for the best case (maximum
coupling), with both averages given from an integration
time of 20 s. We maximized the number of coupled pho-
tons with a two-step procedure. First we identified the
best path for the light through the metal grid into the
fiber spool, finding the spots on the surface of the spool
for which the photon count was higher. By varying the
height of the input point and the direction of the beam,
we selected the best entry points for the attack. The sec-
ond optimization stage was done by fine-tuning the angle
of the beam.
Assuming a Poissonian photon number distribution,
we can write
1− e−ηdµinj = N −Ndc
fs
. (7)
This gives the mean photon number per pulse (or per
gate) µinj = 3.32(21) × 10−3. Using Eqs. (4) to (6), the
corresponding value of µext are found to be
µext = 3.32× 10−6.3 = 1.56× 10−6, (BB84)
µext = 3.32× 10−6.15t−0.25 = 2.35× 10−6t−0.25. (SARG)
(8)
D. Attack analysis
We will show the effects of the light injection attack by
studying the maximum key rate between Alice and Bob.
The maximum key rate of a QKD system (in bits per
pulse) is the highest number of bits Alice and Bob can
extract from the photon exchange and privacy amplifica-
tion stages and still be confident that the eavesdropper
6has no relevant information about the resulting bits. Al-
ice and Bob can create a secret key if their mutual in-
formation I(A:B) is greater than the mutual information
between Alice and Eve I(A:E). The optimal key rate is
Ropt = maxA′←A{I(A′ : B)− I(A′ : E)} where the opti-
mization is in A′, the result of local processing at Alice’s
side.
We will extrapolate our experimental results to differ-
ent laser powers in a scenario where Alice does no post-
processing on her measured bits [R = I(A:B)− I(E:B)].
Our reference is the mean µinj = 3.32 × 10−3 photons
per gate for 17.2 mW, which corresponds to an external
illumination energy of 0.34 nJ in each time bin. While
the 17.2 mW laser cannot inject enough light to compro-
mise the system, if Eve uses a stronger laser, the results
are quite different. We show examples that correspond
to realistically achievable laser energies in the range of
4–10 µJ for each 20 ns data pulse, assuming the num-
ber of photons scales linearly with the laser power. The
photons Eve manages to sneak into the system at these
power levels can significantly reduce the maximum key
rate. Alice and Bob, believing the outgoing photon num-
ber is smaller, might create insecure keys.
Clavis2 uses two protocols: BB84 for short distances,
for channel loss up to 3 dB, and SARG04 for longer links
up to channel loss of around 20 dB [60]. For high laser
powers and long distance links, Alice and Bob underes-
timate how much information Eve can learn and use an
insecure key rate.
For SARG04 we use an approximate key rate formula
[59] that is valid against different incoherent attacks (in-
cluding photon number splitting) in the limit where the
interference visibility V = 1. The key rate is [Eq. (90) in
Ref. 59]
R ≈ η
4
[1− IS(1)]
(
µt− µ
3
12
)
. (9)
Here IS(1) = 1−H
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
1− 12
)
is Eve’s information
if she has access to a quantum memory (storage attack),
with H(x) = −x log2(x) − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) being the
binary entropy function. The actual mean photon num-
ber coming out of Alice is µ′ = µ + µext. Using Eq. (8)
we can write
µ′ = 2
√
t+ µinj10
−3.15t−0.25. (10)
The key rates under the attack are calculated by replac-
ing µ with µ′ in Eq. (9) for different injected photon
values µinj, which are extrapolated from our experiment
assuming a linear growth with laser power.
Figure 4 shows the expected key rate assuming an opti-
mal mean photon number µA = 2
√
t (red solid line), and
compares it to the actual key rate limit taking into ac-
count the increase in the mean photon number at the
output for different laser powers (dashed lines). For
the simulation, we used an optical fiber attenuation of
0.2 dB/km. We see that the maximum distance for se-
cure communication drops for higher powers. An abrupt
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FIG. 4. Evolution of the secret key rate R for SARG04 with
the link distance for an attenuation of 0.2 dB/km. The red
line shows the rate limit estimation Alice and Bob make with
their available data. The dashed lines show the corrected rate
limit when the mean photon number includes the injected
photons from an attacker using lasers with different total en-
ergies in the 20 ns data pulses. The maximum distance for a
secure key becomes smaller at higher laser power.
cutoff appears as I(A:E) > I(A:B), making secret key
extraction impossible. For those powers and distances,
Eve can compromise the key generation process with the
injected photons.
We model the attacks on BB84 assuming combined
photon-number-splitting and cloning attacks [58]. From
the mutual information [Eqs. (22) and (26) in Ref. 58],
we get a key rate
R=
1
2
(µtη + 2pd)[1−H(Q)]− 1
2
µtη
[(
t− µ
2
)
I1(D1) +
µ
2
]
(11)
for a quantum bit error rate (QBER)
Q =
1
2
− V
2
(
1 + 2pdµtη
) , (12)
in a system using a detector with efficiency η and a
dark count probability per gate pd. I1(D1) = 1 −
H
(
1
2 +
√
D1(1−D1)
)
with D1 =
1−V
2−µ/t .
Figure 5 shows the key rate limit for a detector with
efficiency η = 0.1, dark count probability pd = 5× 10−5,
and visibility V = 0.99. The red (solid) line shows the
key rate estimation for the optimal mean photon num-
ber µ = t, which is compared to the key rates when the
mean photon number is µ′ = µ+µext, with µext given by
Eq. (8). Note that under attack, the secure key rate R
slightly improves for most transmission distances. This
is because µ = t we are using is a commonly accepted ap-
proximation. A true optimal photon number that max-
imizes R is slightly different and can be obtained by a
numerical optimization. We have verified that the lat-
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FIG. 5. Evolution of the secret key rate R for BB84 with the
link distance for an attenuation of 0.2 dB/km. The red line
shows the rate limit estimation Alice and Bob make with their
available data. The dashed lines show the corrected rate limit
when the mean photon number includes the injected photons
from an attacker using lasers with different total energies in
the 20 ns data pulses. The maximum distance for a secure key
becomes smaller at higher laser power. We assumed a detector
efficiency η = 0.1 with dark count probability pd = 5 × 10−5
and visibility V = 0.99.
ter produces similar plots, except that the attack then
always reduces R.
To summarise, in Clavis2 the SARG protocol may
be compromised with lasers producing an energy of
∼ 4 µJ in 20 ns or less for links in the 60–100 km
range. For BB84, the injected photons have a negli-
gible effect on the key rate for the short-distance links
where Clavis2 uses that protocol. However a system us-
ing BB84 for long-distance transmission might also be
vulnerable to light injection attacks. It has been shown
that even a small unexpected increase of the output
mean photon number may break the security of decoy-
state BB84 and measurement-device-independent QKD
protocols [61], which are often used at longer distances.
While the known combined photon-number-splitting and
cloning attacks [58] require a quantum memory, the dif-
ference between the assumed and the actual key rates
opens a loophole in the security of the system and must
be fixed. Otherwise we cannot claim physical security
where the only limitation on the attacker is what is al-
lowed by the laws of quantum mechanics. A QKD system
should be safe not only against present attacks, but also
against future, more technologically advanced attackers
(who may have a quantum memory).
For a c.w. laser, 4 µJ in 20 ns translates into 200 W,
which, while achievable, requires specialized lasers and
could have negative side effects. At such high powers the
laser could damage the plastic cover of the fiber spool,
affect other components with the reflected light, or even
injure people coming close the attacked equipment. How-
ever, pulsed lasers can provide the necessary energy per
pulse under realistic scenarios.
In order to choose the best parameters for the pulsed
laser, we need to study the communication protocol im-
plemented in Clavis2. We take as a reference the data
structure for our unit [23], where the data pulses are sent
grouped in packets called “frames” with a period of 1 ms
and each frame contains 1000 data pulses of 20 ns length
with 200 ns period. Most of the time there is no trans-
mission, but if we want to inject photons into each data
pulse, we need a pulsed laser with a repetition rate of
5 MHz. Each laser pulse must be no longer than 20 ns
and have an energy in the microjoule range. If the at-
tacker injects her pulses into the system perfectly, she
only needs to send an average power in the range of a
few watt. For 4 µJ per pulse and a total of 106 pulses
per second, the average power for the attack is only 4 W.
At 1550 nm the eye is less sensitive to damage and,
while these power levels are not safe, they are not ex-
treme. Similarly, previous laser damage experiments
have shown that a few watt can damage detectors when
applied directly but not most of the parts in a QKD setup
[26, 62]. Extrapolating these c.w. results to the possible
damage to the exposed fiber or the covering plastic, it
seems that light injection attacks at a few watt may be
successful and remain undetected.
We can find many commercial lasers close to the needs
of the attack: the 1550 nm lasers used in ranging appli-
cations such as self-driving cars are in the right range of
pulse energies, repetition rates and pulse lengths [63].
Pulsed lasers present additional complications. Cou-
pling to the fiber does not happen at a single strand of
fiber in the spool. Light coupling is distributed at differ-
ent points. While Eve could shape her pulses to maximize
the energy that gets into the time bin where the PM is
active, a realistic attack with a pulsed laser will not man-
age to inject the full pulse energy into the 20 ns bin of
modulation.
There are two limit situations. In the worst case, Eve is
limited to c.w. lasers, like in our experiment. In the best
case there is a single point of insertion and pulsed lasers
in the range of a few watt are sufficient. The single point
of insertion might still be a reasonable assumption. We
have attacked the fiber spool because it offers the largest
target visible from the outside, but we have observed that
light directed to fiber connectors or unprotected pigtails
also couples inside the fiber. If there is a line of sight to
these single points of insertion, attacks become viable in
the lower power range.
In a realistic attack, Eve will likely be in between these
two extremes. Even with distributed coupling in the
spool, she can probably reduce the time her laser is active
to about the frame length and thus reduce her average
power to a few tens of watts.
If Eve is far from the QKD device, beam divergence ow-
ing to atmospheric turbulence and diffraction could also
pose a problem. However the pulsed lasers we have sug-
gested for the attack [63] come from ranging applications
8and they are already prepared to cover large distances.
Most of them work close to the diffraction limit (with
a beam quality factor M2 between 1.1 and 1.4). In any
case, an attacker should try to work as close to the device
as possible.
Taking all these details into consideration, we can com-
pare the light injection attack to the existing Trojan-
horse attacks [55, 56]. In the latter, Eve co-opts the pub-
lic optical channel between Alice and Bob to send light
probes so that she can learn the configuration of the dif-
ferent optical components on each side, particularly the
state of the phase modulator.
There are two important differences. First, the le-
gitimate channel is an essential part of the communica-
tion between Alice and Bob and must always be present.
However, it is an expected point of entry and there
are multiple countermeasures like detectors to monitor
the input and filters to attenuate unwanted wavelengths
[23, 26]. A light injection attack uses unsuspected paths
into the fiber for which there are no planned counter-
measures. Once the photons are inside the fiber, they
go together with the legitimate signal undetected. The
main purpose of this paper is to raise awareness of this
vector of attack so that these paths are blocked during
the design of the system.
Second, for the light injection path we have found in
our device, light coupling is quite inefficient. Trojan-
horse light at 1550 nm can be attenuated between 60 to
110 dB, with different values at other wavelengths de-
pending on the deployed countermeasures [57, 64, 65].
In our experiment, 17.2 mW resulted in an average of
3.32 × 10−3 photons per 20 ns bin (2.13 × 10−11 mW
at 1550 nm, giving a total attenuation of 119 dB before
all the losses in Alice, including the variable attenuation
stage). In principle, the Trojan-horse attacks seem easier
to launch, as they require less power, but they are easier
to detect because the input point is known.
IV. ATTACK ON A QUANTUM RANDOM
NUMBER GENERATOR
Measures against light injection attacks should also be
considered when building other quantum optical devices.
A clear example are quantum random number genera-
tors. Many existing commercial and lab QRNGs work
with different quantum states of light [29], making the
coupling of external light a potential security problem.
We present a proof-of-concept attack on a prototype of
a quantum random number generator [66] with an inter-
nal LED that can be seen from a ventilation hole. The
same path allows a way to the detectors inside the box
and a flashlight directed at certain angles can bias the
generated bit sequence.
Figure 6 shows the scheme of the random number gen-
erator we have investigated. Photons from the LED go
through a 50 : 50 beam splitter (BS) and have an equal
probability of going out each of its two outputs. Each
LED
PMT1
BS
PM
T2
(a)
LEDBS
PMT1
PMT2
(b)
FIG. 6. Quantum random number generator under attack.
(a) Scheme of the QRNG. Light from a LED (green beam)
passes a pinhole and a beam splitter (BS) with two outputs
leading to detectors PMT1 and PMT2. For our attack we
take advantage of a ventilation hole at the top of the case.
With additional light, we can make one detector more likely
to click. We show in blue a possible path from the ventilation
hole to the pinhole that gives access to the metal box with
the BS. (b) Picture of the prototype QRNG [66], with covers
removed from the enclosure and beam splitter box. The path
to the pinhole has been marked with a blue line.
output leads to a photon detector (two photomultiplier
tubes PMT1 and PMT2). Photocounts on PMT1 toggle
an electrical signal from a low to a high logic level. Pho-
tocounts on PMT2 toggle the transition from the high
to the low logic level. If the electrical signal is already
in the low (high) state, there is no effect. The resulting
signal is then sampled at regular intervals to produce a
random bit (0 for the low level, 1 for the high level). If
the photon detection rate is sufficiently higher than the
sampling rate, the resulting bit sequence will be close to
random. The photons are produced using a regular LED
in front of a sealed metal box with a pinhole leading to
the beam splitter and the input to the detectors.
The current through the LED can be adjusted to mod-
9ify the count rate. For count rates of the order of tens
of MHz, the average time between consecutive photons
is much greater than the coherence time of the source
and we can ignore the effects of interference [66]. The
resulting electrical signal is sampled at a rate of 1 MHz.
Most of the light from the LED does not reach the
detectors. In order to reach the single-photon level after
the pinhole, the LED emits at a classical power level. In
fact, the LED generates light in visible wavelengths and
can be seen from the outside.
The whole setup of the studied QRNG was inside a
nuclear instrumentation module (NIM) that went into a
NIM crate. The module enclosure, made of metal, had
four groups of ventilation holes [Fig. 6(b)]. The most
accessible path for our attack was through the holes at
the top of the module close to the front panel (shown as
a blue line in the picture).
Three units of the prototype were used in research se-
tups. We did most of our work on two of them and
obtained similar results. There are small variations be-
tween the units and they have their own control software,
very similar to what can be expected from a commercial
device.
Our attack works by flooding the legitimate photons
from the LED with a much stronger beam coming from
the outside. We produced the latter with a handheld
LED flashlight (Mini-Maglite AA). The injected light
reaches the pinhole and, once inside the box and depend-
ing on the angle, it is reflected and scattered in multi-
ple directions. By manually varying the input angle, we
could maximize the amount of light going into PMT2.
The increased photon number in just one detector biases
the sequence in favor of 1s in the device we did most of
the work with (in other units of the prototype we found
the detectors associated with 1 and 0 were swapped).
This rudimentary attack is enough to show that it is
possible to bias the output sequence. We used the con-
trol software to store two sequences of around 15 MB,
one generated under normal operation and one generated
while directing the output of the flashlight to the venti-
lation hole. We managed to obtain a ratio > 80% for the
number of ones in the final generated sequence just by
moving the flashlight into an adequate angle (99200493
bits were 1 while 22503955 bits were 0). Using the Linux
utilities ent [67] and rngtest [68] we could also see that,
while under normal operation the results of the χ2-test
[69] and the FIPS-140-2 tests [46] were consistent with
a uniform random sequence, the bits generated during
the light injection attack failed these tests. The sam-
ple files are included in the Supporting Information, to-
gether with the results of applying the different random-
ness tests to the sequences.
This is more than enough to launch a successful at-
tack and reduce the entropy of the output in this par-
ticular QRNG design. Even small biases in the random
sequences can compromise many cryptographic protocols
[70]. For instance, in QKD, if the random numbers in the
basis and bit selection are biased, the protocol becomes
insecure [71].
A light injection attack is not limited to biasing the
bit sequence towards one of the values. At the beginning
of the random bit generation, there is a calibration stage
during which the PMT voltages are adjusted to optimize
detection [66]. An attacker could introduce an intermedi-
ate level of light for the calibrated state (50% generation
rate for 0s and 1s). By removing the light Eve can in-
crease the probability of getting 0. By increasing the
light, she can bias the bit towards 1. The light could be
invisible for the people in the room. While we used white
light, the detectors’ efficiency peaks at UV wavelengths
and an attacker could hide the injected light from the
operators of the QRNG.
The device we have tested is only a prototype. More
advanced QRNGs should include some real-time moni-
toring and debiasing. It is recommended that physical
random number generators include internal systems that
check for operation errors [72–75]. However, our attack
could be refined to use pulsed lasers to circumvent these
countermeasures. The best solution is thus to eliminate
any light coupling path.
V. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
We have shown that ventilation openings can be a
problem for the security of quantum key distribution sys-
tems and quantum random number generators. If they
are not properly protected, an external attacker can use
them to couple light inside the optical part of the device.
Light coming from the wrong direction in the normal
QKD optical channel can also alter the intended oper-
ation of the system. For instance, external laser light
can alter the photon sources in QKD devices and has
been shown to weaken security either by seeding the
source laser so that consecutive pulses are not phase-
independent [76], altering the wavelength to identify the
state choice [77, 78], increasing the mean photon number
[23, 61, 78], or performing laser machining to physically
alter the components inside the QKD setup [26, 62]. In
this paper, we have focused on light entering from unsus-
pected places, such as ventilation openings.
In our experiment, we have targeted the delay line in a
plug-and-play QKD system, where a long spool of optical
fiber allows for a large coupling area. Similarly, we have
been able to bias the output of a prototype for a quantum
random number generator. There are other quantum de-
vices with exposed delay lines or detectors that could be
vulnerable to similar attacks. Portions of unshielded fiber
or uncovered pigtails and connectors might also offer a
way inside the optical part of the quantum device.
Precaution suggests any optical component should be
hidden from external light. Our light injection attack re-
quires a line of sight with the device, but servers close
to a window could be targeted from the outside of the
building (see Fig. 1). While in our QKD unit we have
targeted the largest component, the fiber spool, further
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experiments with other components show how photons
can sometimes be injected at pigtails, even with higher
efficiency. The solution is as simple as covering all the
sensitive parts with an opaque material. An explicit de-
sign against light injection should be considered when
building QKD devices.
At the moment of writing, light injection attacks are
not explicitly taken into account when designing QKD
systems. While some commercial QKD systems are com-
pletely enclosed [79], the enclosure seems to be designed
in compliance with security standards against physical
probing and electromagnetic emissions, and not to avoid
light injection attacks. ID Quantique states that proper
countermeasures against the latter type of attack have
been implemented in their current generation of QKD
products [44].
There is a growing effort in the standardization of QKD
[80–88] and the existing drafts already include provisions
for ventilation holes with respect to physical probing, fol-
lowing the example of previous secure device standards.
For instance, the ETSI GS QKD 008 Group Specification
[87] includes the same requirement as the NIST’s FIPS
140-2 standard [46]. Both ask that
“If the cryptographic module contains ven-
tilation holes or slits, then the holes or slits
shall be constructed in a manner that pre-
vents undetected physical probing inside the
enclosure (e.g. require at least one 90 degree
bend or obstruction with a substantial block-
ing material).”
Similarly, there are provisions against an attacker learn-
ing the internal configuration of the device from direct vi-
sual observation of the ventilation holes or slits, as stated
in the ETSI GS QKD 008 Group Specification [87]:
“If the QKD module contains ventilation
holes or slits, then the holes or slits shall be
constructed in manner to prevent the gath-
ering of information of the module’s internal
construction or components by direct visual
observation using artificial light sources in the
visual spectrum. . . ”
While these physical probing attacks also seem un-
likely, it is important to consider them in the standards.
The risk can be greatly reduced with little effort during
the design stage. The light injection attacks belong to
this group of potential problems. We believe standards
for QKD should include a similar requirement to prevent
them, for instance by asking that
“If the QKD module contains ventilation
holes or slits, then the holes or slits shall be
constructed in a manner such that there is no
direct line of sight to the optical components
inside the enclosure. The device shall also be
built so that any indirect path to the optical
components, either by reflection or by diffuse
scattering inside the device, is sufficiently at-
tenuated so that external light with power
up to hundreds of watts reaching the venti-
lation holes or slits is unable to inject enough
photons into the optical scheme to compro-
mise the security of operation. Alternatively,
the optical components shall be enclosed in a
separate section without holes. Alternatively,
each individual optical component and their
connections shall be completely covered with
an opaque material.”
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